War Horse Page 27
The period 1500 to 1800 is generally perceived as the time when the role of cavalry in battle was eclipsed by the increased capabilities of infantry and artillery. This perception is not just overstated, it is demonstratively false. Just as the perception that Medieval cavalry dominated the Medieval battlefield is an inaccurate generalization, the idea that the pike and then the bayonet and musket greatly reduced the role of cavalry on the battlefield is incorrect. If anything, cavalry, operating as one of the three essential combat arms, became increasingly decisive throughout the early modern period.
For a short time pikes successfully challenged the dominance of the heavily armored cavalry, but the introduction of effective firearms was a threat to both the armored cavalryman and the pike infantryman. Eventually firearms and the bayonet eliminated the pike completely from military inventories. Firearms, though making the battle more lethal, did not preclude the use of cavalry. Firepower was a double-edged sword. Cavalry had to be conscious that a well-timed musket volley could destroy an entire regiment. Conversely, musket and artillery fire could create opportunities for decisive cavalry action. Thus, though the battlefield was more lethal, what affected cavalry operations most was the increased complexity of the battlefield. Precise maneuvers, speed, boldness, and timing were more important than ever in achieving effects with cavalry. The margin of error separating cavalry success and failure got smaller.
Cavalry formations in the closing decades of the eighteenth century were much more capable than they were at any previous time. Better individual horsemanship and bigger, faster, and more athletic horses gave cavalry unprecedented mobility and speed; better and more lethal weapons, including firearms and horse artillery, made cavalry more dangerous; and superbly trained formations enabled cavalry to maneuver with precision across all kinds of terrain. When conditions presented themselves on the battlefield, eighteenth-century commanders had lethal and responsive cavalry that could launch battle-winning strikes.
Chapter Seven
ALL THE EMPEROR’S HORSES
Without cavalry battles are without result.—NAPOLEON
The Napoleonic period, 1796-1815, marked a revolution in the politics of Europe and in the history of warfare. The French Revolution introduced the concept of levee en masse, which mobilized the entire population of the nation for war. Nations conducted warfare on a scale never before imagined. Warfare practiced by huge armies of conscripts, and prosecuted with all the power of a fully mobilized nation, replaced the controlled, limited warfare of professional armies as practiced by Frederick and Marlborough. Nations aspiring to continental domination replaced the limited objectives of kings and princes. Consequently, the cavalry forces fielded in the Napoleonic period were immense and drew upon the entire horse population of Europe.
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE NAPOLEONIC WARS
The French Revolution eliminated the French monarchy, the French aristocracy, and other institutions associated with the political and social power of those two sec-tors of society. One of the most important of these was the army. The army was closely associated with monarchial power and personal loyalty to the royal family. Army officers were largely members of the aristocracy. Therefore, as part of the sweeping elimination of the monarchy, the army’s connections to prerevolutionary political institutions had to be broken. In order to create a reliable army loyal to the revolution, the French army had to be completely rebuilt.
Sweeping reform on the scale required by the revolution demanded dramatic change. During the first years of the republic, Royalists either quit the army, were removed, or in drastic cases, were executed. Within a few years, the leadership of the French army at every level was new and, though inexperienced, were largely chosen based on merit. Every able-bodied man was required to respond to the call to the colors. This allowed the French to field armies of extraordinary size. The French army also cut itself loose from depot logistics, traveling with key supplies instead, which dramatically increasing its operational range. The French adopted a new tactical system that, without totally abandoning the infantry line, emphasized columns that moved quickly in the assault to engage the enemy in close combat. Napoleon also introduced a new concept of combined arms warfare, creating the division composed of infantry, artillery, and cavalry as the basic fighting unit, and the corps as an army subunit capable of totally independent sustained operations. As these changes matured and developed in the French army, Napoleon’s forces became almost unstoppable on the European battlefield. French success forced the other European powers to adapt and copy the French techniques or be defeated.
NAPOLEONIC CAVALRY
The cavalry arm reached the highest point of its popular and professional acclaim during the Napoleonic period. Although the proportion of cavalry forces in the overall force during this period declined, this was relative to the much larger conscript armies. Actually, the size of cavalry forces increased dramatically: Austria maintained a force of over 40,000 cavalry through the entire 25-year period—in 1809, the Austrian cavalry consisted of 44,940 men and 42,791 horses. The total allied cavalry in the 1813 campaign numbered approximately 100,000 men and horses.1 In 1788, the French cavalry numbered 62 regiments organized into 210 squadrons with a total strength of 37,782 men. By 1794, the French cavalry force had grown to an astonishing 96,000 men.
Organization
The basic cavalry organizations, companies, squadrons, and regiments did not change in the Napoleonic period. However, Napoleon added important organizations above the regimental level. He created cavalry brigade, division and corps organizations above the existing companies, squadrons, and regiments. As occurred in the eighteenth century, the exact composition of any organization from company to corps depended entirely on the specific time and country. Size of a particular unit also varied over the course of a campaign. In general authorized regimental strength throughout the period varied between 800 to 1500 men. Average regimental battle strength was about 500 men in Europe, and 300 to 400 men in the Peninsula after 1809.2
The most important national cavalry of the era were the French because Napoleon’s army was central to all of the major military actions of the period. In addition, because of its extraordinary early successes, the other powers of Europe copied many of the techniques and practices of the French cavalry. French cavalry reached their optimum level of performance and organization in the years 1805–7. During this time, the Cavalry Reserve alone made up more than 10 percent of the total French army, and each army corps had a full division of well-trained and capable light cavalry. After this period, the army and the cavalry force divided between the northern army in central Europe and the army in Spain. In addition, campaign casualties after 1807 rapidly eroded the quality of French cavalry leadership, troops, and horses.
Had the French cavalry been well trained and equipped, it would easily have been the most powerful cavalry force Europe had ever seen. Unfortunately, the new French Republic did not have the management expertise to maintain such a large cavalry force. By 1796, replacement of horses could not keep up with the numbers that were dying from starvation in their stalls. Part of the reason for the administrative breakdown within the French cavalry was growing too large too fast. Another part of the reason was poor leadership. General Berruyer, inspector general of the cavalry in the armies in Italy, described the state of the French cavalry of that time: “The mounted regiments are in a deplorable state. The great familiarity which exists between superiors and subordinates and the crass ignorance of senior officers who, scarcely knowing how to sign their names, cannot read let alone understand the military regulations which they should be applying, has utterly destroyed discipline. I have seen regiments deficient in everything, whose horses have not been groomed for a year because there are no implements do it with. . . . The cavalry which France possesses at this moment is useless.”3 This was the low point of the French cavalry. Over the coming years, the French cavalry would rapidly improve coincident with the rise to power of Napoleon.<
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In the early years of Napoleon’s reign cavalry were organized into five primary types: cuirassiers, carabiniers (both heavy cavalry), dragoons (medium cavalry), and hussars and chasseurs (both light cavalry). Later, lancers were added as a new type of medium cavalry. A separate component of the cavalry arm were those units of the Imperial Guard which operated only under Napoleon’s personal command.
The cuirassier became the elite of the cavalry. They received special pay and recruited their men and horses carefully for their size (in order to handle the armor). Napoleon usually commanded them personally and excused them from the mundane mounted duties such as scouting or operating outposts that were standard for all other types of cavalry. They earned a fearful reputation among the allied armies. For years after the battle of Austerlitz, the Spanish general Palafox made raising the alarm of “French cuirassiers” an act punishable by death because of the panic it could cause.4
There were only two regiments of carabiniers in the army, and they were usually brigaded together. They were the best and most disciplined horsemen in the French cavalry forces. They had begun their history in the Royal army in 1679, when every cavalry company had two snipers armed with rifled carbines. The French eventually consolidated the snipers, first into companies and then ultimately into two special regiments of carabiniers. They were the royal favorite of the regular cavalry, and always served on the right of the cavalry line—the place of honor. They functioned as heavy cavalry in the Napoleonic period and eventually were equipped for that role, ending the period wearing cuirasses and helmets, and without their carbines.5
The lowest priority cavalry formations were the green-clad dragoons. By the Napoleonic period dragoons had evolved from mounted infantry into a medium cavalry force that rarely dismounted. However, due primarily to a lack of sufficient horses, a provisional dragoon division began the 1805 campaign dismounted and responsible for guarding the army’s baggage train. By the end of the campaign captured horses provided mounts. Napoleon was never impressed with his dragoons and often criticized their poor horsemanship. In 1808, he transferred 24 of the 30 regiments of dragoons to Spain where they were the main cavalry component of the French army there. They did not return to service in the north until the invasion of France and the situation turned desperate in 1814.6
The most numerous cavalry type were the light cavalry, and the most numerous of these were the Chasseurs a Cheval. The chasseurs were a new type of unit that only began to appear within the French cavalry organization in the last part of the eighteenth century. They were organized and equipped identically as the hussars, but since they did not wear the lavish uniforms of the hussars, they were considerably cheaper to raise and maintain. Both units had identical missions of scouting, screening, raiding, and pursuing broken enemies. The cavalry division of the infantry corps, the individual cavalry regiment in the infantry division, as well as the light cavalry component of the Cavalry Reserve were all chasseurs or hussars. Light cavalry were the most numerous of all types in all armies—double the number of all other types combined. All light cavalry, by the Napoleonic period, had acquired the ability to charge as part of the main battle. Russian Cossacks, who did not have the required discipline and formal training, were the only important light cavalry incapable of participating in the main battle. 7
One of Napoleon’s first acts as he consolidated his position as head of state was to form the Consular Guard, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery units. Eventually it reached corps strength and became the French Imperial Guard. Its mounted branch consisted of two major components, the Grenadiers a Cheval, or Horse Grenadiers, which recruited the best men from the heavy cavalry and dragoon regiments, and the Chasseurs a Cheval, which chose the best men of the hussars and chasseurs. The Chasseurs a Cheval provided Napoleon’s personal bodyguard.8
Napoleon’s most innovative organizational concept was the arrangement of the cavalry above regimental level. He created cavalry brigades, consisting of two regiments (later as many as four regiments), and cavalry divisions, consisting of two or three brigades. Divisions of cavalry organized into cavalry corps. Cavalry divisions contained their own organic horse artillery batteries. At its highest level, Napoleon’s cavalry was broken into two very large categories: the Grande Armée Cavalry Reserve formed in 1804 and the cavalry of the army’s infantry corps. Marshal Joachim Murat commanded the former for most of the Napoleonic period. At a minimum, the Cavalry Reserve consisted of the cavalry of the Imperial Guard as well as two cuirassier divisions (8 regiments) and the brigade of carabiniers. The Cavalry Reserve frequently organized into multiple corps as well as the Guard Cavalry.
The cavalry of the army’s infantry corps usually consisted of a division of cavalry for each corps—either light cavalry or occasionally dragoons—and single regiments of cavalry within each of the infantry divisions. This organization of corps and division cavalry achieved several purposes. First, because they were permanent commands, command and control of large numbers of cavalry was not an issue. Commanders could quickly mass large cavalry formations for decisive action. A French army corps using only its own cavalry could, if it desired, mass almost 4,000 cavalrymen for a particular decisive action (by consolidating the 4 regiments of its cavalry division with the individual cavalry regiments of each of its four infantry divisions). Corps cavalry gave corps commanders the ability to operate independent of the main army. Not only did this facilitate the independence of the corps, but it also prevented the piecemeal employment of the army reserve cavalry in support of subordinate units. This allowed the army commander, usually Napoleon, to save his most elite cavalry for use at the decisive time and place in the battle in a grand cavalry charge.
French cavalry, as the chief protagonist of the era, was foremost in importance among the cavalry forces of Europe. However, the allied armies also fielded large and capable cavalry forces. The large Austrian cavalry contained very competent individual regiments, but problems at the higher levels of command prevented them from being as effective in battle as they might have been. The Austrians recognized this characteristic in their own forces and in their 1806 regulations claimed that good officers with poor troops were superior to good troops with poor officers. The British cavalry establishment went through a variety of organizational redesignations during the Napoleonic period. In 1809 it consisted of three regiments of household cavalry; seven regiments of dragoon guards (heavy cavalry); six regiments of dragoons (variously considered heavy or medium cavalry); and more than 20 regiments of light dragoons (light cavalry). Though on paper the British had a very large cavalry force (an authorized strength more than 35,000), most of the British army remained in garrisons in England during the Napoleonic period. For example, in 1809 only 5 of 16 heavy regiments were on foreign service.9
Cavalry Weapons and Armor
In the French cavalry equipment was notable by its absence. In the early republic years French cavalry was notoriously short of all types of equipment. The Colonel of 13th Chasseurs noted his regiment was short 337 carbines, 340 pistols, 150 sabers, 143 coats, 143 pairs of trousers, and 280 cloaks. In 1793, a French hussar unit charged in combat without saddles or sabers, using batons as weapons. The equipment shortages persisted until the very end of the Empire. In 1814, orders directed dragoons to give their muskets to the infantry, and the 1st Chasseurs had only 202 sabers for 234 troopers. Sometimes there was virtually no equipment for new recruits.10 This was a function of the requirement to equip armies of unprecedented size without the manufacturing capability of the industrial revolution, which had not yet had a major impact in Europe.
Pistols were still a part of all cavalry equipment but no longer played any important role in the charge or melee. The medium and light cavalry units carried carbines, and these units varied in the emphasis they placed on the weapon. The French probably put the most value on carbine fire and in several cases tried to break up enemy cavalry charges with it. However, weapons shortages frequently caused the Fr
ench cavalry to give up their carbines to hastily raised infantry units. In some countries cavalry troops thought so little of carbines that they discarded the weapons in the field to save on weight.11
The main weapons of all cavalry were the sword and saber. The difference between the saber and the sword was the curve of the blade. The employment of the weapons was fundamentally different. The sword, with its straight blade, was a thrusting weapon, while the curved blade of the saber was designed for slashing. Most heavy cavalry carried swords. The intent was that they would engage as part of the charge, and their first blow would be a thrust that carried both the weight of the horse and rider behind it. The saber was the weapon of the light cavalry. The curve of the saber added momentum to the slash and allowed a greater impact of the blade in less of an arc. For lancers the saber was a backup weapon. Most casualties inflicted by cavalry were from behind: either when the enemy was routed (most common) or when the cavalry fell upon an exposed flank or rear of a formation.12
Both edged weapons had drawbacks. The saber was preferred in melee combat, but it was difficult to execute a fatal blow. It was not uncommon for cavalrymen to suffer dozens of saber wounds in a single battle with none being fatal. The sword, when used to pierce, was lethal. However, cavalry complained that it was not very effective in melee combat. Napoleonic cavalry leaders split in their advocacy of one weapon over the other. French leader General de Brack favored the sword: “It is the points alone that kill; the others serve only to wound. Thrust! Thrust! As often as you can: you will overthrow all whom you touch, and demoralize those who escape your attack, and you will add to those advantages that of always being able to parry and never uncovered.”13