War Horse Page 29

  The infantry square was a formation that was incapable of offensive action and extremely vulnerable to artillery and infantry attack. Infantry forced to form square took significant risk. If cavalry could force infantry into a square and then bring infantry or artillery in support, the infantry could be defeated even if the cavalry charge was unsuccessful or perhaps never executed at all. Because of this, good infantry commanders resisted forming a square until the last minute. This increased the chance that the square was incompletely formed or incorrectly positioned, and increased the chance of cavalry success.

  Observing the battlefield and having its pulse were keys to the successful employment of cavalry, particularly against infantry who, properly handled, had formations and firepower that were capable of stopping a cavalry charge. Successful tactical employment of cavalry required experience, training, and tactical acumen. The cavalry commander had to instantly recognize windows of vulnerability and then attack to take advantage of them. The Germans would later call the tactical intuition of the commander, so important to cavalry’s tactical success, fingerspitzengefühl—literally, “fingertip feel.” This intangible understanding of the dynamics of battle was required in order to recognize and grasp the complex and diverse factors of combat that were absolutely critical to the successful employment of cavalry on the battlefield.

  HORSES AND HORSEMANSHIP

  The cavalry forces of the Napoleonic period were of unprecedented size. A phenomenal number of horses, certainly the vast majority of the horse population of central Europe, were directly or indirectly involved in the Napoleonic Wars. At the same time, the nature of the battlefield required horses of exceptional quality. They had to have the stamina to endure marches from one end of the continent to the other, and they had to be big, fast, and obedient to achieve success on the battlefield. A large number became casualties. Horse losses were an evitable cost of war. Napoleon’s view was “if such great objects may be obtained as the destruction of a whole hostile army, the State can afford to lose a few hundred horses from exhaustion.”33 Napoleon estimated that he had three or four horses killed for every trooper lost, and he didn’t consider disease and nonbattle injuries. Just the first phase of the 1807 campaign in Poland cost the French cavalry 16,000 horses.34 The nature of war and the tempo of operations put a premium on finding, procuring, and training quality remounts.

  Horses

  The Napoleonic Wars stressed the remount systems of all of the European powers to their limits. Some of them broke down and ceased to function. The Austrians and Prussians continued to run the same type of remount systems that they had operated throughout the eighteenth century. The confiscation of the entire military horse populations by the French in accordance with surrender terms stressed both the Austrian and Prussian remount programs. French cuirassiers reached the peak of their effectiveness in 1807 when they acquired the best of Prussia’s big warmbloods.35

  French Remounts

  The French remount program was the most directly effected by the 20 years of war of the Napoleonic period. The French horse breeding system suffered from the revolution, several invasions, and ultimately defeat. War completely wiped out some of the developing French horse breeds. During the revolution, the royal stud farms were disbanded and 1,116 stallions were sold off. From that point forward, the army purchased its horses on the open market. A shortage in horses drove the cost of each animal higher, making the equipping of cavalry much more expensive than it should have been. It did not help that the republic authorized an unrealistically large cavalry arm. Battle losses only added to the problem, and the military wastage of horses throughout Europe was immense.

  Napoleon tried unsuccessfully to reestablish a state remount system, but the main source of French cavalry horses as they prepared for the campaign of 1812 were war prizes and levies. Ultimately, the French assembled 42,000 new horses for the invasion of Russia.36 This was sufficient to bring the cavalry horse population up to strength, but just barely—units did not have excess horses. The campaign began with the crossing of the Nieman River on June 23, 1812. Napoleon and his allies had a total cavalry force of 80,000 mounts. The cavalry began to experience problems immediately. Forage was so scarce that troopers took straw from mattresses to feed their mounts. Within eight days of the opening of the campaign the army had 8,000 horses die, mostly from lack of care. The Cavalry Reserve itself mustered 40,000 men and horses; three months later, on September 26, the total was 11,434. Marshall Murat, the Cavalry Reserve commander, described the situation as grim and wondered, “What will become of the army this winter.”37

  Fighting several battles along the way, French forces entered Moscow on September 14, 1812. They remained in the city for four weeks waiting for the Czar to surrender. With winter coming on, Napoleon decided to withdraw. On October 19 the French army pulled out of Moscow and began one of the longest and most desperate retreats in military history. The struggle out of Russia became a fight against distance, weather, and starvation more than a fight against the Russian army. In one fortnight in mid-November, the cold was so intense that 30,000 horses died. The only positive aspect of their death was that they provided meat for the starving army. When the French finally crossed into Poland in November 1812, the cavalry force was nearly destroyed. Typical of the cavalry losses were those of the 7th Hussars, who began the campaign with 1,100 mounted troopers and ended the campaign with 120 men and 20 horses. In total, French cavalry lost all but 1,500 horses.38

  The 1812 losses, forced the French to conduct the campaign of 1813 chronically short of horses, and with cavalry units that were an odd combination of seasoned veterans and untrained recruits. The horse shortage continued into 1814. The depot at Versailles reported that it had only 6,284 horses for 9,786 recruits.39 The campaign of 1812 had broken the back of the French cavalry, and it was impossible for the French cavalry to recover from the debacle. When Napoleon returned to power briefly in 1815 veterans flocked to his colors. However, no matter how many veterans he gathered, it was not possible to mount them on the quality horses necessary to conduct the type of operational maneuver and shock attacks that were the hallmarks of his earlier campaigns. Those horses simply did not exist.

  The British Thoroughbred

  In sharp contrast to the French, the British remount system provided quality mounts to the cavalry throughout the Napoleonic period. The British cavalry remount program operated solely on the purchase system. The main source of horses was professional breeders who were large landowners or prosperous farmers. Because the British army kept a very small permanent military establishment during peacetime, there was no profit in breeding purely for army needs. What was available to purchase as remounts were the standard commercial breeds. The best of the British breeds were bred for sport.

  Breeding for sport was a tradition of the English royalty. Charles II (1660–85) went to great efforts to import Barb, Turk, and Arab mares to breed as racehorses. He managed to put together a stable known as “the king’s mares” that greatly influenced the creation of the British racehorse on the dam’s side.40 On the stallion’s side the English racehorse was the product of three great Asian stallions: the Byerley Turk, captured by Colonel Robert Byerley at the siege of Buda (modern-day Budapest) in 1688 from a Turkish officer; the Darley Arabian, bought by Thomas Darley in Aleppo Syria in 1704; and the Godolphin Arabian, which came to the earl of Godolphin by way of the king of Tunis and the king of France in 1729. The offspring of these three stallions established the beginning of the English Thoroughbred breed. The stallions provided speed and spirit to the breed, while the mares provided size and strength. Although the late-eighteenth-century Thoroughbred was slightly smaller than the modern example, by the Napoleonic period the basic breed characteristics as described by the International Museum of the Horse were set:

  The Thoroughbred stands a little over 16 hands on average and its appearance reveals its Arabian ancestry. A refined head with widely spaced, intelligent eyes sits on a neck whic
h is somewhat longer and lighter than in other breeds. The withers are high and well defined, leading to an evenly curved back. The shoulder is deep, well-muscled and extremely sloped while the heart girth is deep and relatively narrow. The legs are clean and long with pronounced tendons and move smoothly in unison through one plane. The bone structure of the upper hind leg makes room for long, strong muscling. The thighbone is long and the angle it makes with the hipbone is wide. The powerful muscling of the hip and thigh continues to the gaskin that is set low. Coat colors in Thoroughbreds may be bay, dark bay, chestnut, black or gray; roans are seen only rarely. White markings are frequently seen on both the face and legs.41

  Today, all modern Thoroughbreds can trace their linage back to the three great stallions that founded the breed and imparted the characteristics that made the Thoroughbred one of the most important breeds in history.

  In the late eighteenth century, fox hunting became a popular sport in England. The horse markets responded to the needs of the sport and developed a hunter-type horse. This horse, the hunter, was not a particular breed, but rather was a horse that had the attributes to make a good fox-hunting mount. Fox hunting required a horse that was fast to keep up with hounds, had endurance to hunt extended distances for an entire day, and was nimble so that it could carry itself well cross-country and jump obstacles when necessary. The Thoroughbred so closely matched the requirements of fox hunting, that the hunter-type horses were often pure Thoroughbred or strongly influenced by Thoroughbreds. The army officer class were avid hunters, and beginning in 1780s, Thoroughbred and Thoroughbred-type hunters became the preferred type selected by the army. This preference continued through the end of the horse cavalry in the twentieth century. Many of the breeders of these great cavalry mounts were located in Ireland, and for the remaining history of the British cavalry a large portion of the remounts were Irish hunters.

  The Thoroughbred is a very spirited horse. Some British cavalrymen believed that their horses contributed to the command problems that the British cavalry had controlling the charge. One writer in the Royal Military Chronicle described the problem in 1811:“in every charge the British horses run away with their riders; and that, after the first effort has been made, it is a work of much time and difficulty to bring them again into regular line.” The solution recommended was more and better horsemanship training, and training cavalry remounts in the classic high school manner. But in general British cavalry was satisfied with the superior power their mounts gave them in the charge.42

  Horse Equipment

  Horse equipment evolved during the Napoleonic period into basic designs which would not vary significantly until the end of horse cavalry. Two pieces of equipment which represent the state of the art of horse equipment of the period are the English universal pattern (UP) saddle and the double bridle.

  Saddles

  In most countries, Napoleonic period cavalry saddles were of a modern design that, with a few notable exceptions, would not change in its basic features for the rest of the history of the horse cavalry. The British universal pattern saddle used at Waterloo was similar in all major respects to that used 40 years later in the Crimea, and 100 years later in World War I. It was a good saddle, comfortable for the horse and rider, allowed air to circulate, and distributed the weight of rider and equipment evenly. It was also easy to repair with simple tools and materials. Finally, it was easily adaptable to different size and shapes of horses simply by adding strips of felt to the sidebars or varying the thickness of the folded saddle blanket.43

  Prior to the late eighteenth century, there was no uniformity of equipment within the British cavalry. Regimental commanders individually contracted for equipment of their preferred design. A regimental commander could make a profit operating his regiment and some commanders skimped on equipment, while others were lavishly furnished. This began to change at the end of the century. In 1796 the Board of General Officers decided on a standard pattern for heavy cavalry saddles. In 1805 they decided on a different standard for light cavalry. The regimental commander still made the actual purchase. The British saddle had to be suitable for operations on a global scale. It also had to be adaptable to all types of terrain, weather, and different types of horses.44

  In 1791 Frederick, the duke of York, visited Prussia to study the Prussian military. His brother, the prince of Wales, asked that he arrange to send examples of Prussian horse equipment to England. The duke sent two complete sets. One was a cuirassier heavy cavalry set and one was a hussar set. The heavy cavalry saddle UP model of 1796 was virtually a direct copy of the Prussian cuirassier saddle acquired by the duke of York. The major difference between the two was that the British model had brass edging to protect the cantle of the saddle.45

  Like the heavy cavalry saddle, the British based their light cavalry saddle on the Prussian model acquired by the duke of York. The Prussians copied their hussar saddle design directly from their adversaries, the Austrian light cavalry. The saddle design had been used by the Hungarian cavalry since about the fifteenth century and in the eighteenth century was adapted for use by all Austrian cavalry. The design not only spread to Prussian and Britain but was also used during the Napoleonic period by France, and in 1812 was adopted by the American army.46 The hussar saddle would remain the standard British light cavalry saddle until after the Crimean War.

  The hussar saddle was a relatively simple design. A high pommel and cantle connected two beech wood sideboards. Iron gullets reinforced the pommel and cantle. A rawhide seat ran from cantle to the pommel, tied to the sideboards by rawhide bindings. The seat rode well off the horse’s back. Two slotted extensions called spoons sat in the center of the pommel and cantle. Burs and fans were extensions of the sidebar forward of the pommel and cantle, respectively. These provided stations for the attachment of equipment in front of and behind the saddle seat. A padded leather cover hooked to the spoons on the pommel and cantle and draped over the wood and rawhide tree of the saddle.47

  French light cavalry used a design similar to the other European hussar saddles. French medium and heavy cavalry saddle design was hard on horses and was made worse by shoddy construction. Because they had no metal bands to reinforce the forks and keep them in position the saddles broke down and put weight directly on the horses’ spine. Improper fit and poor construction caused back sores on horses. By 1811 saddles were being constructed with wood so green that they did not hold shape, warped, and became loose. When Napoleon inspected the equipment of the elite Polish lancers of the Imperial Guard he found 60 broken saddlebows.

  The Double Bridle

  The double bridle first appeared at the very end of the seventeenth century and the equitation writings of the duke of Newcastle referred to the new equipment. Eighteenth-century high school master Guérinière also mentioned it. Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century—about the time of the Seven Years’ War—European cavalry began to convert from a curb bit bridle to a double bridle, which included a curb bit, and a snaffle bit called a bridoon. The double bridle required a separate set of reins and separate check pieces for each bit. The curb bit was a standard curb bit and fixed to the horse in the normal manner. The bridoon had smaller rings than a standard snaffle and positioned above the curb bit and curb chain. A rider could identify the bridoon reins because they were slightly wider than the curb reins.48 It is unclear exactly what drove the conversion of cavalry bridles from the standard curb bridle to the double bridle. It may have been the influence of high school training on cavalry officers, who insisted that the bridle be used by their troopers. Regardless of the reason, by the Napoleonic period it was in general use throughout Europe and remained, in various configurations, the accepted military bit and bridle combination through the twentieth century.

  Early military manuals do not explain the intent of the double bridle. Guérinière writing in the 1731 indicates that the bridoon’s primary practical purpose was as a backup feature “in case of an accident, when the reins have broken, for example
, or have been cut in combat, one may thus resort to the bridoon.”49 Though expert horseman advocated the routine use of both bits, its is doubtful that this was practiced in the field during the Napoleonic period because, given the relatively low level of horsemanship, the average trooper did not require nor had the skill to exploit the subtle capabilities of the double bridle. Most of the depictions of eighteenth- and even nineteenth-century cavalrymen show troopers riding exclusively on the curb, with the bridoon reins slack and draped over the pommel of the saddle. The use of the double bridle today is primarily traditional rather than functional.50 It is likely that the average cavalryman of the Napoleonic period used the bridoon bit as a backup set of reins and bit, as Guérinière suggested.

  Horseshoes

  Horseshoeing was a standard part of all cavalry routine maintenance operations. In the Napoleonic period campaigns were long and covered hundreds of miles. Poor shoeing or failing to consider the impact of shoeing had a considerable effect on operations. In the British cavalry, each regiment had a farrier major who was a sergeant and each company had a company farrier. The farrier sergeant worked directly for the regimental veterinarian and supervised the work of the company farriers. He was also responsible for the maintenance and movement in the field of the farrier carts.51

  The terrain in the Spanish campaign, for example, was extremely tough on horse’s feet. Horseshoes were an important aspect of maintaining the horse’s service-ability in the rocky terrain of the region. Horseshoes lasted only 15 days instead of the usual 25. Initially the British cavalry suffered from a shortage of horseshoes. During the Corunna campaign, the 7th Hussars lost 560 horses due to lameness caused by a lack of shoes. The British did not evacuate hundreds of horses that survived the campaign because of lameness. Sadly, the required shoes were in the theater of operations, but the supply system could not get them to the front. Subsequently, British cavalrymen were required to carry a full set of shoes and nails as part of their standard kit on campaign.52