War Horse Page 18
Because of the large numbers of horses and their importance, steppe tribes marked their horses with brands to indicate the family, clan, or tribe that owned them. The brands could either be cuts on the ears, or marks made on the shoulders or hindquarters with a hot iron. The Sarmatians were the first to mark their horses; the Alans and Mongols also used horse marks. Since the practice was well established in other steppe tribes researchers believe that the Huns marked their horses also.18
The evidence indicates that the primary Hun war horses were geldings. Geldings were also preferred in the Mongol army because the army prized discipline in both horse and rider. Mares were included in the herd because of their milk. Discipline in the Mongol army was codified in the Yasa, which also addressed issues of horse management: horse herds and breeding were centrally controlled; all colts except for the absolute best were gelded; horses were broken at the age of two, but not considered ready for campaign until they were five; and stallions were not used on campaign because they were too difficult to control. To enforce and oversee the management of horses, Genghis Khan established a supervisor of geldings and supervisor of horse herds. These positions were appointed from among the senior army leadership.19
Horsemanship
The steppe tribesmen were perhaps the most gifted horsemen that the world has known. Sidonius described horsemanship among the Huns: “Scarce had the infant learnt to stand without his mother’s aid when a horse takes him on his back, You would think that the limbs of man and horse were born together, so firmly does the rider always stick to the horse; any other folk is carried on horseback, this folk lives there.” All the steppe tribes shared this skill, which was integral to both their survival and their military success. The Mongols placed their children on horses at the age of three and armed them with bows by the time they were five. Their primary horsemanship instructor was their mother.20
The concept of the saddle originated with the steppe tribes, and the steppe produced the first framed saddles. Contemporary chroniclers specifically describe a pyre of horse saddles that Attila intended to set afire when the Romans surrounded him in 451. The archeological evidence in nomadic grave sites of the fourth and fifth centuries AD indicates that the Hun’s saddle had a straight vertical pommel and a somewhat higher cantle that was inclined to the rear. The Huns probably did not have stirrups because the Germanic tribesmen as well as the Romans with whom they fought would have copied this innovation. Stirrups, which appeared around the fifth or sixth century on the steppe, were made of wood or iron and were round. The Alans, a steppe tribe that appeared in the west after the Huns, probably brought the stirrup to the attention of Europeans in the sixth and seventh centuries. Mongol saddles were made of wood and leather. They had a very high flat pommel, probably as an aid for archery, and an equally high cantle. The saddle provided a secure seat and had significant gullet that gave good wither clearance. The stirrup straps were centered, putting the rider in a balanced position. A thick felt pad was laid between the wood and leather saddle and the horse.21
The steppe archer rode with a short stirrup. The French traveler Beauplan commented on Crimean tartar horsemanship in the seventeenth century: “They are very skillful and dangerous when mounted, but they are badly seated because they have their legs folded up and ride very short; they are mounted on horse like a monkey on a greyhound.”22 Europeans did not understand the balanced seat of the steppe horseman in the seventeenth century any better than they had in the Middle Ages.
The Mongol cavalry preferred a snaffle bit, but the bit they used was very thin making it more severe than most snaffles. An unusual feature of the Mongol bridle was that a noseband was connected to the cheek pieces and included a chin strap. This is similar to a modern drop noseband bridle, which keeps the horse’s mouth closed, thus preventing the horse from avoiding the bit. The Mongols valued control of their horses. Control was necessary to train the horses to execute the intricate tactics of the horse-archer formations. The steppe horse was not a naturally agile horse. It tended to move with its weight on the forehand and had a weak hindquarters, which made it less able to turn quickly and accelerate. The Mongols compensated for this conformation flaw by training on the circle; this taught the horse to carry itself in a more balanced manner and strengthened its hindquarters. This training produced a horse that impressed Marco Polo: “Their horses are so well trained they can turn as quickly as a dog.”23
Steppe warriors could literally live in the saddle. The Eastern Roman historian Zosimus, writing in the beginning of the sixth century AD, said that they “live and sleep on their horses.” The Mongol cavalry carried their rations with them on the horse. They poured mare’s milk into leather pouches where it curdled into cheese. They soaked horsemeat in saltwater and carried it under the saddle as jerky. One European observer erroneously reported that a testament to the ferocity and barbarity of Mongol troops was that they ate raw horseflesh cut from the horses. The observer likely observed the troops cutting strips of jerky from underneath their saddles. In extreme situations Mongol cavalrymen could subsist by periodically drinking the blood of their horses. They would make small cuts and drain blood for this purpose from the horse’s neck.24
STEPPE WARRIORS: THE EARLY TRIBES TO THE HUNS
The first of the great steppe tribes were the Scythians. They inhabited the region north of the Black Sea and east to the Caspian Sea from about 700 BC to 100 BC. In the 600 years of their existence the Scythians laid the foundations for warfare on horseback and the mounted archer armies. The Scythians were one of the first mounted forces that made use the composite bow. The Scythians rode bareback and used a snaffle bit. Scythian burial excavations have revealed horse remains in the 15 hands range and are similar to the modern Akhal-Teke breed. Scythian cavalry included both mounted archers and lance-armed and laminar-armored heavy cavalry. In their encounters with the Assyrians and especially the Persians, the Scythians demonstrated the characteristic steppe warrior capability of withdrawing and avoiding combat until the conditions were most favorable. The Scythian king Idanthyrsus replied to a challenge to battle from Darius the king of Persia by saying, “If you want to know why I will not fight, I will tell you: in our country there are no towns and no cultivated land; fear of losing which, or seeing it ravaged, might indeed provoke us to a hasty battle.”25 In two years of campaigning Darius was unable to bring a sizable Scythian force to battle and ultimately withdrew from the steppe in frustration.
Like all the nomadic steppe tribes, their forte was raiding and their targets were the border empires of the northern Middle East including the Assyrians and the Urartu. The Scythians participated in the destruction of both of these kingdoms. The Scythians raided as far south as Egypt. They also traded with the same people with whom they fought, and it was through the Scythian contacts that the concept of fighting from horseback was introduced into the Middle East. Between 514 and 512 BC the Scythians repelled an invasion by the Persian king Darius and in the 490s the Scythians allied with Sparta against the Persians. The Persians, Greeks, and Macedonians never defeated the Scythians. In fact, they held their own and outlast-ed the eras of all three of these important regional powers. However, in another characteristic of steppe tribes, the land of the Scythians was ultimately inherited not by a sedentary power, but rather by another steppe tribe, the Sarmatians, migrating west. The Sarmatians who had moved into the area north of the Black Sea in the late fifth century BC coexisted for a time with the Scythians. The strength of the Sarmatians grew as the Scythians declined in influence and importance. In the third century BC the Scythians withdrew into Crimea where the Bosphoran Kingdom defeated and absorbed them in the second century.
By the first century AD the confederation of subtribes that made up the Sarmatians extended from the east coast of the Caspian Sea to the Danube where they abutted the eastern edge of the Roman Empire. For the next two centuries, the Romans and the Sarmatians skirmished along the Danube. The Sarmatians were unable to defeat the disci
plined legions of Rome and their leaders continuously sought accommodation with Rome. By the second century, the Romans permitted some tribes to migrate into the interior of the empire. Numerous groups of Sarmatians were absorbed into the Roman army, mostly as cavalry alae. The records indicate a significant Sarmatian cavalry presence among the Roman garrisons in Britain.
As the Sarmatians were absorbed into the Roman Empire their place in the western steppe was taken by the Germanic Goths who were not pastoralists.26 However, the Goths’ period of ascendancy on the western steppe was relatively short. In the fourth century a new and uniquely fierce migrating steppe people known as the Huns quickly and violently forced the Goths across the Danube into the protection of the Roman Empire. Thus by the time the Goths and the Romans fought the battle of Adrianople in 378 AD, the Huns had already established themselves as the predominant tribe in the western steppe from the Danube east along the Black Sea to the Caucasus Mountains, having conquered the regions of the both the Alans and the Goths. In the late fourth century the Huns came in direct conflict with the Romans.
The initial Hun raids originated in the Caucasus Mountains and penetrating into the Roman Middle East: Anatolia, Armenia, and even as far as Syria. Raiders also crossed the Danube into Thrace. The Roman military was in disarray, still suffered the disruption caused by the defeat at Adrianople, and could not mount an effective response before the Huns successfully withdrew to the steppe with the profits of their raiding.
Neither the Germanic tribesman nor the Romans could match Hun horsemanship. The Roman historian Ammianus Marcellinus writing in the late fourth century describes Hunish warriors as “almost glued to their horses, which are hardy, its true, but ugly, and sometimes they sit on them woman-fashion, and thus perform their ordinary tasks. And when deliberations are called for on weighty matters, they all consult for a common objective in that fashion [mounted].” The Huns combined steppe riding skills with the typical tactics of the mounted archer as described by Zosimus: “they wrought immense slaughter by wheeling, charging, retreating in good time, and firing arrows from their horses.”27 Ammianus Marcellinus wrote in 392 a description of Hun tactics based on the accounts of the defeated Goths:
When provoked they sometimes fight singly but they enter the battle in tactical formation, while their medley of voices makes a savage noise. And as they are lightly equipped for swift motion, and unexpected in action, they purposely divide suddenly in scattered bands and attack, rushing about in disorder here and there, dealing terrific slaughter; and because of their extraordinary rapidity of movement, they cannot be discerned when they break into a ram-part or pillage an enemy’s camp. And on this account you would not hesitate to call them the most terrible of all warriors, because they fight from a distance with missiles having sharp bone, instead of their usual points, jointed to shafts with wonderful skill; then they gallop over the intervening spaces and fight hand to hand with swords regardless of their own lives; and while the enemy are guarding against wounds from sword thrusts, they throw strips of cloth plaited into nooses over their opponents and so entangle them that they fetter their limbs and take from them the power of riding or walking.28
While Hun raiding died down in the first years of the fifth century a mass migration of German tribes broached the Roman border along the Rhine River. The expansion of the Huns into the barbarian territories east of the Rhine including the Hungarian plain caused this migration. The German tribes, including Goths and Franks, were shepherded into the Western Roman Empire in a process that eventually would break down the political integrity of that part of the empire. In 408 AD the Huns launched a large raid into Thrace in the Eastern Roman Empire.29 Paying off the Hun leadership stopped that raid, but that set the precedent of the Romans paying tribute to the Huns along their border in exchange for peace, but it was a policy that proved of limited effectiveness.
During the late fourth and early fifth centuries the Huns were far from a unified political entity. The various subtribes had a great deal of independence, and thus their relationship with the Romans varied considerably. There were instances of the Huns raiding Roman holdings as well as instances of Huns providing mercenary forces to Roman commanders for military operations against Germanic enemies. The Romans also persuaded Hunish subtribes to fight independent of direct Roman control against Rome’s enemies. This relationship speaks to the growing weakness of Rome as well as to the lack of unity among the Huns.30
Because of their small numbers, the Huns could not completely overcome their steppe rivals or consistently challenge the Roman military. The individual Hun subtribes totaled only about 5,000 members and were only able to mount forces of about 1,200 warriors. This was likely the size of the standard mounted Hun force whether it was raiding Roman holdings or serving as a mercenary force under Roman command.31 Only the lure of exceptional loot or the influence of charismatic leaders could unite subtribes for military operations. This phenomenon explains why, during some periods, there is no record of large-scale Hun military activity. Absent a driving cohesive factor the Hun subtribes lost much of their military ambition.
The united tribes, however, were a formidable military force. Three factors combined to create the Huns’ military prowess. The first two were the traditional capabilities of bow and horsemanship that they shared with the Scythians and the Sarmatians before them.. With their exceptional equestrian skills and marksmanship, the Huns advanced the state of horse archery. Their composite bow itself was innovative, with its flexible ears on the tips and its asymmetrical design which enabled the Hun to wield a considerably larger bow than other horse archers. The Hun bow was between 55 and 62 inches in length. The archer drew the arrow at a point about a third the way from the base of the bow. This allowed the bow to still clear the neck of the horse. These modifications gave greater power to the bow and did not affect its accuracy.32
What made the Huns special, and what has become to some degree their historical legacy, is the psychological affect they had on their enemies. All of the contemporary observers of the Huns remarked on their fierce and startling appearance. Ammianus described them as “so prodigiously ugly and bent that they might be taken for two-legged animals or the figures crudely carved from stumps, which are seen on the parapets of bridges.” Saint Jerome, writing at the beginning of the fifth century, succinctly stated the psychological impact of the Huns, observing that “The Roman army is terrified by the sight of them.”33 This psychological advantage probably mitigated the fact that Hun horsemen wore little or no armor protection. This lack of armor did not discourage them from closing with the armored cavalry of Rome.
The most famous Hun leader, who flourished when their military power was at its height, was Attila. Attila came to power in 434 AD at the death of his uncle Rua. For the first few years he shared power with his brother Bleda. In 445 Attila eliminated Bleda and consolidated all the Hun tribes under his personal control. Attila pursued different policies with the western and eastern empires. From 445 to 451 he maintained relatively friendly relations with the western empire and in fact provided Huns to serve under Roman command. At the same time he followed a belligerent policy with the eastern empire. He first raided the eastern empire in 440, taking advantage of a war between the eastern empire and the Persians, to capture and destroy numerous cities along the Danube. In 443 the Eastern Romans agreed to provide an annual tribute of 2100 pounds of gold as well as other concessions in exchange for peace. In 447 Attila again invaded the empire and created a swath of destruction that led to the walls of Constantinople. The Huns captured or destroyed more than 70 cities and fortresses. The Eastern army confronted Attila, and he destroyed it in battle. In a peace treaty signed in 448, Attila doubled the gold tribute and insisted that the Romans move the boundaries of the eastern empire well south of the traditional Danube frontier.
With the eastern empire cowed, Attila turned his attention to the western empire. In early January 451, Attila moved his forces, numbering 10,000 troops, acro
ss the Rhine into Gaul. Less than half of the force, however, were cavalry, the rest being Germanic allies who were mostly infantry. Still, the horse herd supporting the campaign numbered between 50,000 and 60,000 horses.34 His stated objective was Toulouse, the capital of the Visigoths, but in reality he intended to destroy as many of the Western Roman cities as possible, and extracting favorable concessions from Valentinian III, the Western Emperor. By April, Attila’s squadrons were ranging as far west as Belgium, and on April 7 the fortress city of Metz fell to the Huns. The Huns then moved toward Orleans, whose defenses successful rebuffed the Hun attack in June. Meanwhile, a Roman army under Senator Flavius Aëtius had come up from Italy and linked up with the Visigoth army under King Theodoric, and this combined force moved to intercept Attila. The two armies met toward the end of June somewhere in the modern French province of Champagne.
The allied army formed a battle line with the best troops on the flanks: the Visigoths on the left flank and the Romans on the right flank. Less reliable tribal forces held the center of the allied line. Attila deployed the Huns with the main Hun force in the center and the wings held by allied tribes. The two forces battled throughout the day and into the night. Finally, the Romans forced the Huns to retreat to the safety of their baggage wagon laager. The Visigoths proposed to lay siege to the wagons and ensure the complete destruction of Attila and his force, but the Roman leader, Aëtius, pointed out that the Visigoth’s king, Theodoric, died in the battle and therefore their new king needed to return home to ensure the legitimacy of his reign. With the departure of the Visigoths, Attila was able to successfully extract the remainder of his force back across the Rhine.35