War Horse Page 19
The defeat of his army did not discourage Attila, and he planned an even more aggressive campaign the next year. This campaign took him over the Alps in the spring of 452 and into the heart of Italy. Attila’s return to the offensive caught the Romans by surprise. There was no army to oppose him, and through the summer Attila captured and destroyed dozens of Italian cities including Milan. The road to Rome was open and the city undefended. The Western Roman Empire’s only hope to end the rampage of the steppe warriors was negotiation. A delegation of distinguished citizens, including Pope Leo, met with Attila and induced him to end the campaign. An important factor in Attila’s decision was that Italy had just suffered a period of famine, and disease was rampant throughout the region.36
Attila returned to the Hungarian plain to plan his next action. The new Eastern Roman emperor Maximus had refused to pay tribute, and Attila planned to punish the eastern empire and reestablish Hun dominance. As the Hun army assembled in 453 for the new campaign Attila took a new wife. On the morning after his wedding his lieutenants found him dead in his bed. The forthcoming campaign was canceled, the territories were divided among his sons, of which there were many, and this transition set the stage for the ruin of Hun dominance. Within months of Attila’s passing his sons began warring with each other, individual subtribes asserted their independence, and conquered allies such as the Ostrogoths successfully rebelled. Some Hun subtribes were absorbed into the Roman Empire as cavalry formations. In a relatively short period, the Huns lost their tribal and cultural identity including their language. Little evidence remains in the modern world of the 50 years during which the Huns were the premier and most feared military power in Europe.37
Although Attila and the Huns had little long-term impact on the course of European history other than to move along the dissolution of the Western Roman Empire, the Huns demonstrated the superiority of a quick-moving cavalry army based on the horse archer. The military importance of the horse-archer army would not diminish over the next several hundred years. When it next appeared in European history the Mongols coupled it with an efficient and effective command system to create arguably the most powerful army seen in the history of warfare.
THE MONGOLS
By the thirteenth century, the mounted archer and the deadly composite bow was an old weapons system, however, it was in the 1200s that the history of this weapons system intersected with the history of an army that would bring the military horse and rider to its full potential. The Mongol armies of the thirteenth century, with the mounted archer as their primary combat system, achieved a level of world domination never equaled. Over a period of fewer than 200 years, they executed a series of campaigns which brought most of the known world under their rule.
In their initial campaigns orchestrated by the great Genghis Khan, the Mongol army was almost a pure cavalry army. Certainly one of the purest horse armies ever fielded. Over time, they developed other capabilities including considerable skill in siege craft, which was necessary to capture fortified cities. They also built large and capable fleets. In most cases conquered adversaries-turned-allies built, manned, and often commanded the siege equipment, infantry contingents, and fleets. The core of the Mongol armies throughout the period of their empire remained the horse archers and their steppe horses.
At the time of the birth of Temuchin (c. 1162)—who would later rename himself Genghis Khan, what is now modern Mongolia was inhabited by five tribes: the Mongol and Tatar in the east, the Kerait tribe in the center, the Merkits to the north, and the Naimans in the west. Despite speaking different languages, the Mongol and Tatar tribes lived the same pastoral nomadic life and freely intermarried. The Tartars were probably the most important of the tribes because the Chinese supported them. Medieval Europeans referred to all the eastern steppe tribes as “Tartars.”38
Temuchin was born into the family of a minor clan chieftain. Tartars murdered his father and created an animosity that would eventually result in the destruction of their tribe. With their chief dead, the followers of Temuchin’s father abandoned their chief ’s family and Temuchin struggled to survive. As he came into young adulthood, his natural leadership and martial abilities attracted a personal following sufficient to establish his own clan within the Mongol tribe. This group of close followers became the nucleus around which Temuchin ultimately built his army and they provided many of the generals, such as Subotai, who later commanded their far-flung expeditions. Temuchin shrewdly allied himself with the Kerait tribe, and used them to further increase his power until he eventually was able to claim leadership of the Mongols. From that point on, he systematically waged war on, and defeated, all of the tribes in Mongolia. His policy was not to destroy (though the fate of the Tartars was an exception) but rather to assimilate the other tribes under his leadership. Manpower was too precious not to make use of it whenever possible. By 1206 he had succeeded in unifying by force the eastern steppe tribes under his leadership and at a great quriltai he was acclaimed Genghis Khan (universal leader).39 Genghis provided an organizational ability and vision, that combined with the proven horse archer weapons system, permitted the Mongol army to successfully conduct military operations on a scale never before attempted and never again equaled.
Genghis Khan’s objective was China. The purpose of his other campaigns was to shape strategic conditions to permit the best Mongol forces to focus on the conquest of China. Genghis Khan envisioned the conquest of China in five operational phases. The first phase was a campaign to secure the approaches into northern China. This required the conquest of the land of the Xixia (1205–10) who could threaten any force attacking China from the north. The second phase was a reconnaissance in force of the northern Chinese Empire, the Jin. This took the form of a large-scale mounted raid and then a campaign that secured the northern holdings of the Jin (1211–15). The third phase of the Chinese campaign was securing the rear or southwestern border of the Mongol Empire through the campaign against the Khwarazm Empire in Persia (1219–25). The fourth phase was the complete conquest of the Jin (1230–34). The last phase was the conquest of the southern Chinese Empire, the Song (1254–79). Genghis Khan personally supervised the first three phases but died as the armies prepared for the final offensive against the Jin. It was in the last two phases of the conquest of China that the Mongol armies matured into a comprehensive military machine capable of sophisticated siege and naval operations while retaining its core competency of mounted combat in open battle.
China was the great prize designated by Genghis Khan, but the Mongol armies were numerous and competent enough to pursue campaigns that expanded the empire into areas remote from China. As Genghis’s heirs, Ogedei Khan and Kublai Khan, supervised operations in China, other Mongol leaders led armies into Europe as far as Hungary and the Adriatic (1237–42), and into the Middle East as far as Syria (1251–60). After China was conquered, it became a base for expansion into Southeast Asia as far as modern day Indonesia. Conquering Korea was very difficult and required a series of invasions between 1216 and 1273. Japan was invaded twice (1274–81) and saved due to the intervention of a typhoon that destroyed much of the Mongol invasion fleet.40
The Mongol Army
At its core the Mongol army was a cavalry army in which every warrior was mounted. Soldiers were extremely disciplined, and well trained. The Mongol leaders held commanders personally responsible for the equipment and training of their men. John of Piano Carpini, a friar, observed the Mongols and wrote: “These men are more obedient to their masters than any other men in the world, be they religious or secular.”41 The army had a superb command and control system and the ability to conduct planning on the strategic level. Most importantly, the army had a unique and unmatched logistics capability which gave it strategic mobility.
A major training task conducted by the army was the annual hunt. That event involved the entire army, and all units that were not on active campaign in the distant regions of the empire replicated the event wherever they were. The h
unt began with the army deployed in a single line by unit with the troopers literally stirrup to stirrup. When the entire army assembled, 100,000 cavalrymen stretched in a single line for more than 60 miles. The line moved out at a controlled pace driving the game before it. Gradually, under the control of their officers, the units on the wings would advance ahead of the center. Ultimately, after moving for days or weeks and covering hundred of miles, the wings would gradually converge to complete a circle and the army would then drive the game to the center. The hunt caught all manner of animals from rabbits to bears. The soldiers did not allow any game to escape and killed anything that attempted to break out of the trap. The hunt tested all of the soldiers’ weapons skills. Once the circle closed a mass killing concluded the hunt and provided meat and hides to take care of the army through the coming winter.
The hunt served to provision the army and tested and trained all of the army’s critical combat skills. It exercised the army command and control at every level as commanders kept the various far-flung elements of the hunt coordinated. Unit positioning and movement had to be tightly controlled. Officers provided constant tactical command and detailed supervision of their formations. Individual weapons skills were extremely important as the trapped larger game attacked the mounted troops. Hunting was a skill used to train warriors in many cultures, but none used it on the scale of the Mongols nor used it to train the type of synchronized movement which was one of the unique characteristics of the Mongol armies.
Mongol armies were bigger than the average European and Middle Eastern armies. This was due to the mobilization of the entire society and flexible logistics. All adult males below the age of 60 were liable for military service. The Mongol army organized on a simple decimal system. The smallest group was the squad of 10 men led by the captain, the arban. Each man swore allegiance to the arban, who was personally loyal to the leader of the 100 men of the jaghun. This leader in turn owed his loyalty to the mingghan, the leader of a 1,000-man organization which fit similarly within the tumen of 10,000 horsemen. This system, like feudalism, emphasized personal loyalty, but it was also a meritocracy where promotion and advancement were based on ability. Though large, the size of Mongol armies was usually overestimated in contemporary accounts. In part, the large number of remounts that accompanied the army on campaign contributed to the impression of the large size of the army. Typically, a steppe warrior had 5 to 6 remounts. Thus, a typical Mongol tumen, included roughly 50,000 war horses. The Mongols also intentionally encouraged the inflation of their numbers, even going to the extent of mounting dummies on remount horses led in trail behind a single cavalryman. Two relatively reliable sources place the strength of the Mongol force at the quriltai of 1206 at 105,000 men, and the strength at the time of the death of Genghis at 129,000. These numbers seem reasonable because they are sufficient to execute the operations which were conducted by the Mongols, and they were logistically supportable given that a 100,000-man army would have been supported by more than one million horses.42 Still, considering the scope of Mongol operations, the standing army was not large. When it met enemies in battle the Mongols were often outnumbered and defeated their adversaries with skill and not size.
Several tumen combined to form each of the three components of the fighting army organization: the left wing, the right wing, and the center. During the conquest of the Jin the right wing of Genghis’s army numbered 38,000, the left wing 62,000, and the center 29,000.43 Size of the wings was adjusted based on the tactical situation and the mission by transferring tumen between the army components. Wings were capable of being detached from the main body and operating as separate field armies. The tumen was also totally self-sustaining and capable of independent action such as an advance reconnaissance and raids. The independence of the tumen permitted the army to move on multiple axis. This type of organizational flexibility would not be matched in Europe until Napoleon introduced the corps system at the end of the eighteenth century.
The organization of the army transcended tribal lines. Genghis Khan intentionally assigned individuals of different tribes to the 1,000-man unit. This had the effect of completely destroying the clan and tribal structure leaving no alternative to the individual but to transfer his loyalty to his unit and to the universal khan. Exceptions were made for the original loyal clans and tribes which aided Genghis in establishing his hegemony over the tribes, but even these trusted tribes were not allowed to organize in any unit larger than a thousand.44
The army came to include infantry and special troops who were auxiliaries. These troops were not Mongols but were impressed into the army for special purposes from conquered territories. Generally they were not critically important to operations with the exception of siege experts who were recruited from China and Persia. The two primary pieces of equipment they used were a light and a heavy catapult. These two pieces of equipment gave the Mongols the ability to capture cities. Both eventually evolved into the simpler trebuchet designs. The light catapult was designed to be disassembled and carried on pack horses. It was assembled and manned by a crew of 40. The heavy siege equipment had to be either pulled behind oxen or built on site. If the defenses did not warrant heavy siege equipment it was not brought on campaign. The light siege equipment followed all Mongol armies as part of an artillery train. Even in open battle mobile light catapults played a role hurling smoke bombs designed to conceal unit movements and add confusion to the battlefield. If the enemy defended in dense formations the artillery could be used to pound designated positions to create a weak point for attack.45
A Mongol army on the move was a large enterprise. A 10,000-man tumen was supported by 40,000 noncombatants, and as many as 600,000 animals of all types. A typical Mongol army on the move consumed eight square miles of grassland a day. The march schedule typically was organized into a morning march, afternoon grazing of animals, and evening rest. In this manner the army could sustain a movement rate of 14 miles a day. For many reasons, the army logistics system worked better if the army and its support structure continued to move. Grazing requirements prevented the army from remaining in one place very long.46
Although the horse archer was the symbol of the Mongol Army, heavy cavalry delivered the decisive attack. Mongol armies included a large number of heavy cavalry, typically up to 40 percent of the force. Heavy cavalry wore lamellar armor with either iron or hard leather scales. A cuirass of this type weighed approximately 20 pounds. Heavy cavalry were armed with a 12-foot lance which had a hook on it designed to pull adversaries off their mounts. The horses of the heavy cavalry were likewise heavily armored with laminate armor including a chamfron, peytral, crinet, and crupper. The heavy cavalry followed the horse archers in an attack and were also an effective counterattack force.47
Mongol Army Strategy and Tactics
Sometimes planning for Mongol operations occurred years in advance. Planning gave very careful consideration to logistics. A reconnaissance in force often preceded the campaign to test the enemy capabilities as well as determine the impact of terrain on operations. River crossing requirements and the grazing potential of the area of operations were of particular concern to Mongol leaders. Mongol leaders understood the concept of strategic political objectives and formally pronounced the campaign objectives so that subordinate commanders could use them to provide direction and coherence to the army on campaign. Mongol leaders told operational commanders what to achieve but not how to achieve it.48
The need for the army to graze its animals required subunits to march in a widely dispersed formation, but the units were able to assemble quickly for battle. This required a sophisticated means for communicating at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. During battle, command and control was exercised by officers who used flags, drums, signal arrows (which whistled as they flew), and lanterns. At the operational level, couriers maintained contact between various Mongol units ensuring that column commanders understood where friendly forces were located so that they could synchronize
actions even though the units were out of direct contact with each other. The couriers primarily carried messages and reports but also could send signals using a simple semaphore system.49
At the strategic level, a corps of elite imperial couriers carried official messages between field armies and the khan. Hundreds of post stations positioned at 30-mile intervals supported these couriers. The post stations provided logistics support for the system including remounts, had provisions for riders, included fresh riders, and had a small garrison of soldiers for protection. This system, know as the Yam, was very similar to the American Pony Express mail service developed 700 years later. As the army moved in the field, commanders established new courier stations expanding the network. A message could travel up to 120 miles a day in this system. A special rider was dedicated to important messages while routine messages used relays of riders.50
The Mongol armies were extremely mobile—able to move twice as fast as their enemies. This mobility, combined with their ability to synchronize the movement of multiple columns, allowed them to always have the initiative. The Mongols rarely were attacked; they were usually the attacker. When battle was not imminent, the average movement was 14 miles a day. A Mongol army could cover 40 miles a day and up to 60 miles in a day if unusual conditions required it. In 1221 Genghis Khan moved his army 130 miles in two days. In 1241, Subotai moved his army 180 miles in three days through snow.51
A contemporary European observer Robert of Spolato commented on the tactical proficiency of the army: “There is no people in the world who know so well how to overcome an adversary in the open by skill in warfare.” The army maneuvered and moved based on the concept of “reconnaissance pull.” Mounted scout units ranged 35 to 70 miles ahead of the main body. They also scouted to the flanks and rear. The scouts were the eyes and ears of the commander as he sought information. They also provided a highly effective security screen that prevented the enemy from gaining information about the Mongol army and prevented surprise from any direction. Using this strategy, scouts and their reports “pulled” the army in the direction of the enemy. The scouts then carefully managed handover of the battle to the main body. As the main body approached, the scouting force would begin to skirmish with the enemy, distracting and fixing them in place. The main body came on line well to the rear and began to move its wings forward to envelop the enemy. The scouts maintained constant communication with the army leaders during the approach to battle. The scouts permitted the main body to maneuver to achieve an advantageous position before it ever came into physical or even visual contact with the enemy.52