War Horse Page 5

  The other major type of bit used during the ancient period was the curb bit. The curb bit is designed around a solid bar that is placed through the horse’s mouth. Its design applies pressure vertically, not laterally like the snaffle. The main parts of the bit are the bar through the horse’s mouth; the shanks that extend down from the bar and are the attachment point for the reins; a curb chain that attaches on both ends of the bar and runs under the horse’s chin; and the port, which is a break in the bar that relieves pressure on the horse’s tongue. The curb bit is primarily a breaking mechanism on the horse. Pulling the reins together to the rear puts pressure on the tongue and bars of the mouth, forcing the horse’s head down to slow or stop the animal. In the hands of an unskilled rider, the curb bit can be a severe means of controlling the horse. Under emergency conditions, the curb allows the rider to quickly and efficiently cause the horse to react. Since curb bits are not very effective in getting lateral action from the horse, and because they can be severe, riders use them most often in combination with indirect, or neck reining. The neck rein technique gives instruction to the horse by laying the rein on a side of the horse’s neck to indicate desired direction. The horse moves away from the side that it feels the rein on and thus changes direction. The major advantage of the curb bit and neck reining is that they only require one hand, thus allowing the other hand to hold a weapon. The disadvantage is that precise control of direction and speed is not as easy as with a snaffle bit.

  The bits described above are simple and generally do not cause significant discomfort to the horse when used properly. Many working bits, both ancient and modern, are designed to get very specific, and dramatic, reactions from the horse by inflicting discomfort and pain. Protrusions on the bit, sharp points and edges, and thinness all make the bit more severe. On curb bits, the length of the shank is an important indicator of severity. The type of bitting used by an army can be an indicator of the quality and type of horsemanship practiced by that army and its cavalrymen. It is often easier to get a particular reaction from a horse by increasing the severity of the bit than by training the horse and rider. Still, a severe bit in the hands of a skillful horseman with “soft hands” can be quite comfortable for the horse.

  The Greeks often used very severe versions of the snaffle bit. Xenophon, an exceptional horseman, understood the subtleties of bits and commented on it.

  But if a rough [severe] bit is put in, it must be made as easy as a smooth by lightness of hand. . . . Whatever the kind of bit, it must be used according to the following rules, which are in every case the same. . . .The horse’s mouth must not be checked too harshly, so that he will toss his head, nor too gently for him to feel it. The moment he acknowledges it and begins to raise his neck, give him the bit. And in everything else, as I have insisted over and over again, the horse should be rewarded as long as he behaves well.14

  Xenophon wrote his treatise on horsemanship in the early fourth century. Clearly, the ancient cavalrymen understood well the intricacies of horse control through the bit.

  The ancient cavalrymen understood the aids and understood that effective riding required that all the techniques be used in combination. Thus a simple command such as moving from a walk to a trot would involve squeezing with the legs, shifting the center of gravity slightly up and forward, clicking with the tongue, and easing pressure on the reins. A well-trained horse would respond to the smallest application of any one of the aids, but when time and conditions permitted, the well-schooled cavalryman would use them all as part of a continuous training process. Different types of cavalry would emphasize different training techniques. Leg and body aids would be important to the horse archers. Heavy cavalry using lance and sword would emphasize neck reining and possibly more advanced turns and kicks. Experts in later centuries estimated that it took at least two years to train a basic proficient cavalryman, and much longer to produce an expert horse and rider combination.

  CAVALRY IN THE GREEK–PERSIAN WARS

  Compared to the tens of thousands of cavalry employed by the Persians, the Greek contemporaries of Darius I did not have much of a cavalry force. Though the Greeks considered the horse a symbol of status and wealth, they focused the bulk of their martial resources and attention on their infantry forces. The tradition of mounted warfare, which had influenced armies in the Middle East for two millennia, was not part of Greek city-state warfare. As noted earlier, much of Greece was steep and rocky terrain. And what remaining land was suitable to agriculture was intensively cultivated. Pasture for non-food-producing animals, such as the horse, was a luxury in Greece. Only wealthy private citizens could afford to buy and maintain horses. Most city-state governments were democratic or inspired by democratic conventions.15 The horse’s association with an elite, wealthy element reduced the horse’s popularity and discouraged the Greeks from emphasizing mounted warfare. The Greeks viewed the hoplite, on the other hand, as a citizen soldier, a concept compatible with the Greek ideals of democracy.

  In addition, the nature of Greek warfare, built as it was around the phalanx, was not conducive to mounted combat. The ideal warrior in most of the Greek city-states was a critical component of classical Greek culture. The mounted warrior was not a part of the Greek warrior icon, which contributed to the lack of emphasis on cavalry up to the time of the Greek–Persian wars.

  Those wars mark the first meeting between highly disciplined infantry and cavalry formations. Between 499 BC and 449 BC the Persian Empire, firmly in control of all of what is today the Middle East, made numerous attempts to subjugate the Greek city-states that controlled the sea commerce of the Mediterranean and consistently agitated for revolt against Persian rule. The famous battles of Marathon (490 BC), Thermopylae (480 BC), Salamis (480 BC), and Plataea (479 BC) are representative of the military confrontation between Greece and Persia, and the frustration of the Persian plans. In these confrontations the Greek infantrymen and seamen, though badly outnumbered, ultimately prevailed over the army and navy of the Persian rulers Darius I and Xerxes I. The battle of Plataea, where the cavalry army of Persia met the Greek hoplite army, is particularly illustrative of the dynamics of battle between the two armies.

  The Persians under Xerxes I invaded Greece in 480 BC with the specific purpose of establishing Persian rule over the independent-minded Greek city-states. Estimates of the size of the army vary greatly, but it was undoubtedly huge. The Greek historian Herodotus puts the total at over 2 million fighting men—clearly an exaggeration. Modern historians place the size of the combat forces at between 50,000 and 200,000 men. Thus, a reasonable estimate might be approximately 125,000 combatants. The army represented not only the military power of Persia but also the administrative proficiency of the Persian Empire. It was a significant accomplishment to support the massive army as it marched hundreds of miles through unfriendly territory. About 75,000 animals of all types, but primarily horses, supported the cavalry forces of the army and the logistics trains. Modern historians believe that the cavalry component of the army numbered about 10,000. Xerxes’s generals probably intentionally reduced the size of the cavalry force due to the logistical requirements of the army’s animals (daily water and fodder) and the limited ability of the terrain to sustain the herds.16

  The invading Persian army, advancing along the Greek coast, overawed local rulers, cities, and small kingdoms and encountered no significant resistance. Macedonia and Thessaly both offered earth and water gifts, the symbols of submission, and contributed symbolic contingents to the Persian army. As the Persians advanced, the majority of the Greeks ended internal conflicts and formed the Hellenic League in opposition to the invaders. Mobilizing and assembling the various Greek city-state armies took time. As a delay tactic, a small contingent of Greeks, under the leadership of the Spartan king Leonidas, blocked the Persian advance along the coast at Thermopylae. Leonidas’s force of 8,000 infantry delayed the Persians for three days and cost the Persians 20,000 casualties. Despite the valor of the Spartan king, the P
ersian army was unstoppable after their victory at Thermopylae and quickly moved to overrun southern Greece. The mobilization of the Greek armies was incomplete, and Athens was abandoned in the face of the Persian advance. The only force able to oppose the invading Persian army was the Greek fleet. As Athens burned, the two great fleets met near Athens in the narrow straits of Salamis. Through superior seamanship and tactics the Greek fleet won a decisive victory, crippling the Persians. With control of the sea contested, if not lost, and winter coming on, Xerxes withdrew the bulk of his army from its exposed position in southern Greece to a more secure base in Thessaly where there was sufficient fodder for the army’s animals. Xerxes himself, with a small portion of the army, returned to Persia.

  Xerxes placed the Persian army in Thessaly under the command of his cousin and son-in-law, Mardonius. It was a formidable force—likely over 100,000 combatants, including the bulk of the cavalry force. After much internal debate, the Greeks united and fielded an army of about the same size to contest the Persians’ inevitable resumption of the campaign. Though similar in size, the composition of the two armies was vastly different. The composite Persian army consisted of Persian and allied infantry, and cavalry. The Greek army was much more homogenous—essentially light infantry and hoplites—all from the various member states of the Hellenic League. The Greeks numbered approximately 38,000 hoplites and 70,000 light infantry armed primarily with slings and javelins.17

  THE BATTLE OF PLATAEA, 479 BC

  Mardonius began the spring campaign of 479 BC with the objective of forcing the submission of Athens. He planned to accomplish this through a combination of force and diplomacy: Mardonius threatened to destroy Athens while simultaneously using the Macedonian king, Alexander I, to negotiate with the Athenians for a peaceful surrender. If this maneuver did not work, he planned to engage the Greeks in a decisive battle and win their submission through force of arms. The possibility of Athens surrendering to the Persians forced the Hellenic League to mobilize its forces and give Mardonius the decisive battle he desired.

  As the Greek army moved from its defensive positions in Corinth, the Persians withdrew from Attica, into Boeotia, where the open terrain would allow them to use their cavalry to its best advantage. This also shortened the Persians’ logistics line to their forward base at Thebes while forcing the Greeks to extend their logistics from their base in Peloponnesus. Mardonius picked the valley of the Asopus River for the battle.

  As the Greek army moved into the Asopus River valley, the Persian army, already encamped on the north side of the river, harassed them with long-range archery. The Greeks employed their light infantry and Spartan helots, armed with javelins and slings, to keep the mounted bowmen out of range of their columns. The Greeks were able to occupy their first positions well east of the town of Plataea without much difficulty. The light infantry deployed to protect both the vulnerable flanks of the phalanx formations and the Greek supply lines.

  The Persian horsemen continued their harassing tactics. The steady shower of arrows required the hoplites to remain in formation, using their shields to reduce the impact of the Persian archers. The Greeks placed light infantry among the phalanxes to respond to the Persian cavalry, but the light infantry could not match the mobility of the cavalry. The Persians were able to direct archery fire throughout the Greek ranks. The Persian cavalry commander, Masistius, personally directed the cavalry attacks against the 3,000 hoplites from Megara. The Megarians requested assistance from the Athenians who sent 300 hoplites and dismounted archers to a position forward of the Megarians to disrupt the Persian attacks and return fire. Masistius personally led the cavalry against the Athenians in an attempt to eliminate the exposed infantry. During the action, an arrow took down Masistius’s horse, and before the Persian commander could rise the Athenian hoplites killed him. The Persian cavalry attacked ferociously to recover the body of their popular leader. The Megarians moved forward to support the Athenians, and in the close combat between horseman and hoplite the cavalry, casualties mounted rapidly. When the lightly armed and armored cavalry realized the futility of close combat with the heavy Greek infantry they broke off the attack.

  Following the successful counterattack against the Persian cavalry, the Greeks moved their entire army farther west to a position between Plataea and the main road between Thebes and Athens. The Greeks took their positions on the high ground, the Asopus Ridge, south of the river to protect the Gargaphia spring that supplied the army’s water. The Persian army mirrored the Greek move and took up new positions west of their permanent camp, along the north side of the Asopus River. Persian archers positioned on the north bank prevented the Greeks from using the river as a water supply.

  For eight days the two opposing armies observed each other across the river. Despite the fact that the river was easily fordable, the only action during this period consisted of forays by the Persian cavalry to harass, with fire, the nearly 4-mile-long line of hoplites. The Persian commander Mardonius finally broke the standoff. On the eighth day, he launched a cavalry raid around, and behind, the Greek left flank, capturing a pass though the mountains south of Plataea. The Persian cavalrymen captured 500 pack animals laden with grain for the Greek army. More importantly, the Persian cavalry gained control of the critical supply line back to Peloponnesus.

  For three more days the Persian cavalry continued to harass the Greeks. On the eleventh day, as the Greeks adjusted their line, Mardonius launched an all-out cavalry attack. The form of the attack was typical of Persian cavalry charges: squadrons charged in formation to a firing position, halted, and fired. As the squadrons became disorganized, were threatened with counterattack, or had expended their arrows, a new squadron moved up. The old unit rode to the rear to reorganize. Some Persian squadrons rode in very close to the phalanxes and fired while moving. This attack caused some material losses to the Greeks but was not decisive. However, it was psychologically frustrating. The Greek light infantry was unable to disrupt the fire of the Persian archers. In the confusion and dust of the Persian mounted attack, a group of Persian cavalry managed to slip inside the Greek lines and foul the Gargaphia spring. At the end of the eleventh day the Greek commanders held a council of war. Their supply line was cut; the soldiers were frustrated; their primarily water supply was fouled; and after eleven days, they had been unable to engage the Persians in battle. The Greek generals decided to withdraw.

  The withdrawal was not to be a retreat but rather a tactical repositioning of the army to reestablish a water supply and clear out the Persian cavalry disrupting the supply line. The Greeks withdrew at night. A night withdrawal, while in contact with the enemy, is a difficult and potentially dangerous operation. The Greeks discovered this at dawn the next day when they realized that their center had withdrawn in the wrong direction and that the Spartans had delayed their withdrawal because one of their commanders thought it was dishonorable. The result was a broken Greek battle line with the Spartan and Tegeans in the east, isolated from the Athenians and others positioned around Plataea. More importantly, the sun was up, and Mardonius could easily observe the disordered state of the Greek line.

  Mardonius took advantage of the Greeks’ disarray. He immediately ordered his cavalry forward against both Greek contingents. The infantry soon followed. Mardonius’s intent was to focus his best troops, his Persian forces, against the best Greek troops, the Spartans, knowing that if he destroyed them he would also destroy the Greek army. As the Persian cavalry caught up to the Spartans’ retreating columns, the Spartans turned and under a hail of fire formed their phalanx. The Tegeans, moving with the Spartans, did likewise. The Persian cavalry fire held the Spartans at bay until the Persian infantry caught up with the pinned-down Spartans. However, rather than close with the phalanx, the Persian infantry employed their archers, javelin throwers, and slingers to continue the bombardment of the Spartans. Meanwhile, the Athenians, attempting to link up with the Spartans, were stopped and engaged by the Persian allies and right wing ca
valry.

  The nerve of the Tegeans broke under the bombardment, at about the same time the Spartans realized that the Athenians would not be coming to their aid. The reaction of Greek infantry when discipline broke down was not what one might predict: the Tegeans did not retreat. They attacked. As the Tegean phalanx charged, the Spartan officers ordered the Spartan phalanx to attack in support. The armored Greek infantry were overpowering in close combat, and they slowly, but inexorably, thrust and cut their way through the lightly clad Persians. Mardonius and his elite 1,000-man personal guard could not repel the tide. He and most of his entourage were caught in the melee and killed in the Greek assault. As the Persian leader fell, the Persian infantry broke and began to stream back to their fortified camp. The panic spread quickly through the ranks. Soon the Persian allies also broke before the Athenians and began to stream back toward the camp or down the road toward Thebes. The Persian cavalry were largely immune to the power of the phalanx as long as they kept their distance. The cavalry’s discipline held and they were effective covering the retreat of the army. With unbroken cavalry formations still on the field, the Greeks had to maintain control and cohesion, which slowed their pursuit of the Persians. This lesson was brought home to the Megarians who, in the haste of their pursuit, were caught in open formation by Theban cavalry allied with Persians. The Megarians lost 600 men before they could drive the horsemen off.18