War Horse Page 6
With the rout of their army at Plataea, Persian designs on the Greek mainland were extinguished. The Greeks have historically been given great credit for their ability to repeatedly defeat the invading Persians, but in reality they owe their success more to chance than any other factor. One historian summed up the war this way: “The Greek resistance to Persia from Marathon onwards is a catalogue of bad planning, gross inefficiency and selfishness punctuated with occasional acts of brilliance and heroism. It is incredible that they could possibly have won. The Persians, on the other hand, displayed excellent strategy, a great deal of energy and considerable bravery but suffered from appalling bad luck. In the final campaign they completely out-maneuvered the Greeks, and then made one miscalculation which cost them the war.”19 The Persians’ unity of command and their resources were superior to the Greeks’, and they were certainly at least equal in tactical command ability. The Persians completely outclassed the Greeks in cavalry. Had the Persians prevailed at Plataea, their victory undoubtedly would be attributed to the dominance of their cavalry arm.
Greek military men were not blind to the lessons of the Greek–Persian wars; they understood the limitations of their one-dimensional military system. However, it is not easy to overcome culture and history. It would require a hundred years, and the pain of the Peloponnesian War, for the mounted warrior to earn a place within the Greek military system. When the Greek cavalry finally asserted itself, it did so in a manner that was a reflection of their philosophy of war; they did not create a European copy of the Asian cavalry tradition represented by the Persians at Plataea, but rather a unique mounted version of the hoplite.
GREEK CAVALRY
The Peloponnesian War, and subsequent city-state wars, pitted the various Greek states against one another in increasingly sophisticated warfare from 458 BC until 362 BC. The cavalry component of the Greek military evolved throughout this period, taking on increasing importance. The cavalry’s new role and value changed partly because of the lessons learned from the Persians, and partly as a natural evolution of tactics. Similar Greek hoplite-centric armies sought any means to achieve an advantage over the enemy; and cavalry became one way to achieve an edge and secure victory.
The Greek cavalry developed a fighting style distinctly different from that of the Persians. The Greeks were not particularly superior to the Persians in a number of important areas. However, the Greeks were clearly dominant in the area of close combat. In this arena the factors of victory were morale, unit cohesion, armor, discipline, and individual skill. In all of these, the average Greek hoplite was superior to even the most elite of the Persian infantry. The hoplite was the centerpiece of the Greek way of war; and therefore it was natural that the hoplites had a significant influence on the development of the Greek cavalry.
Although the early Greeks had developed small elite cavalry organizations called Hippeis, these units, used almost exclusively to carry messages and for scouting, had all but disappeared by the time of the Persian wars. The two most dominant Greek states—Athens and Sparta—did not field any cavalry during the Persian wars. Cavalry contingents existed in several other city-states and participated in the Persian wars, but mostly allied with the Persians. Thessalian and Boeotian cavalry were both present at Plataea on the Persian side. Riding and fighting skills needed for an effective cavalry were not unknown in Greece, many of the wealthier hoplites rode to war but fought as part of the phalanx while grooms minded their mounts during battle. Surviving Greek pottery clearly shows Greek warriors in hoplite armor sitting astride horses. Scholars believe these images represent hoplites traveling to battle rather than cavalry because the hoplite armor, particularly the Corinthian helmet, was totally impractical for mounted combat.
Over the almost 100 years of war that ravaged Greece after the defeat of the Persian invasion, true Greek cavalry developed. In Thessaly, unlike other Greek states, the cavalry arm of the military had always been dominant. Thessaly was located north of the main centers of Greek culture. Therefore, rather than looking toward Athens and Sparta, Thessaly was influenced by the Middle East—Assyria and then Persia—and the steppe horse tribes—Scythians and Thracians—on its northeast border. Thessaly was also topographically different from most of Greece. Ample pasture land permitted a large number of horses to be maintained. Finally, Thessalian culture developed a feudal structure where the wealthy and powerful owned land and horses and determined the structure of the army. An indicator of the feudal nature of Thessaly, as well as the importance of horse culture, is that a typical levy for military service on an aristocratic overseer and a section of land was 80 infantrymen and 40 cavalrymen. Cavalry could make up as much as half of the Thessalian army. One source puts the composition of the Thessalian army at the end of the seventh century BC at 10,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. The Thessalian cavalry reached its largest size when they fielded a force of 8,000, including their allies, early in the fourth century.20
The Thessalians were outstanding horsemen, and the horse was integral to their culture. One of the national sports was tauroxathapsia, or bull throwing. This sport was quite similar to modern American rodeo bulldogging: the mounted Thessalian chased down a bull and then leaped from the horse to wrestle the bull to the ground. The Thessalians were also avid horse racers and in fact won the horse race competition in the first Olympic games.21
As regional warfare engulfed Greece, the Thessalians were in great demand as mercenaries. By acquiring their service, or the service of other Greeks who also had equestrian skills (such as the Boeotians), a particular side could quickly acquire an advantage over an opposing phalanx. However, it became obvious that a function as important as mounted combat could not be trusted to mercenaries. In 457 BC, during the battle for control of central Greece at Tanagra, 1,000 Thessalian mercenary cavalry deserted the Athenian army and joined Sparta, costing Athens the battle. Events such as these illustrated with blood and defeat the fact that each Greek state required its own competent and reliable cavalry arm.22
Cavalry quickly became an integral part of Greek warfare. The primary offensive purpose of the cavalry was to threaten the flanks and rear of an enemy phalanx. An additional task for the cavalry was to isolate a phalanx from its logistics base. Defending cavalry covered the phalanx from enemy cavalry attack. To gain an offensive advantage, light infantry, using javelins and slings, mixed with attacking cavalry, adding weight and dimension to the assault on the defending cavalry. Defending cavalry, in response, added light infantry to create an integrated force to protect the phalanx which, if successful, could free up the defending cavalry to then attempt to threaten the enemy’s phalanx. The phalanx was still the center of Greek warfare, but as the fourth century BC entered its second half, winning battles became more complex; no longer was the superior discipline and push of the hoplites in the phalanx enough to secure victory. The superior hoplite force could be defeated if its supporting cavalry and light infantry were not equally superior. Victory in fourth-century Greece required the deft coordination of a combined force of three arms: cavalry, light infantry, and hoplite heavy infantry.
Greek cavalry tactics, as they evolved over the course of the Peloponnesian and subsequent wars, put equal emphasis on attack and defense. The first issue that the cavalry had to address was the opposing force’s cavalry. A Persian cavalry force attacked the enemy through a series of archery assaults. Because of the hoplite influence, Greek cavalry had little respect for missile weapons—particularly bows. The main means of destroying or routing the enemy, whether he was cavalry or a hoplite phalanx, was through close combat with lance and sword. Cavalry could be attacked directly, whereas the phalanx had to be attacked in its rear and flanks. Greek cavalry, like the hoplite phalanx, relied on discipline, morale, training, and physical ability to beat their enemy: knee to knee and horse to horse. Fighting from a distance using missile weapons was not honorable.23 A fast cavalry charge was the Greek solution to a missile attack.
Much of the equipment
and technique of the Greek cavalry was similar to that of the Persians. Individual troopers were armed with a lance that may have been a dual-purpose weapon, used in hand-to-hand combat or thrown. An open-faced helmet and a light corselet of armor, boots or lower leg wrappings, and a sword would have completed the standard accoutrements of the Greek cavalryman. Notably absent as a standard and important piece of equipment of the Greek cavalryman was the bow. Instead, two javelins were standard in addition to a spear. Over time the javelins were discarded. A rather severe snaffle-type bit controlled the horse. A body covering armored the horse providing some protection from glancing blows. This light armor was made of either heavy padded cloth or leather. They also may have had bronze armor protecting the horse’s neck and thighs.24
ALEXANDER’S CAVALRY
The Thessalians were, without a doubt, the finest Greek cavalry. However, skillful integration of all arms won battles. By the middle of the fourth century, all the Greek states had some sort of cavalry force. To have the best army one had to be superior in all arms, and cavalry was essential to victory. The best Greek army emerged in 342 BC out of the northernmost of the Greek lands: Macedonia.
Over a 36-year period, from 359 to 323 BC, Macedonia fielded one of the greatest armies the world has ever seen. The formula for Macedonian military success was the adroit combination of highly proficient infantry, cavalry, and light forces combined with exceptional tactical command, strategic vision, and unmatched personal leadership and bravery. Among all these attributes, the cavalry was the arm upon which the Macedonian leaders Philip II and his successor and son, Alexander III (Alexander the Great), relied to achieve victory.
Macedonia was on the fringes of the various wars that plagued Greece through the fifth and fourth centuries. They contributed a small force to the battle of Plataea— on the Persian side.25 Macedonia’s peripheral involvement appears to have been a function of its somewhat isolated location as the northernmost of the Greek states. Many of the southern Greeks looked upon the Macedonians as semibarbarian and only marginally Greek. Macedonia did, however, come in conflict with the northern Greek port city of Chalkidike. Chalkidike had easy access to the sea—something that was sorely needed in mostly landlocked Macedonia. Chalkidike and Athens were allies in the Athenian League and this alliance became a source of conflict between Macedonia and the southern Greek power. While skirmishing with its Greek neighbors, Macedonian’s primary concern in the fourth century was its non-Greek neighbors: Illyria (modern-day Balkans) to the northwest and Thrace (modern-day northwest Turkey) to the east. Throughout the first half of the fourth century Macedonia was being invaded by, or invading, one or more of these adversaries.
In 359 BC King Perdiccas of Macedonia and 4,000 of his men died in a losing battle with the Illyrians. The morale of the Macedonian army was shattered, and Perdiccas’s brother, Philip II, took the throne. Philip immediately set about rebuilding the army as a matter of national survival. His focus was the infantry because he judged Macedonian cavalry to be generally competent. Philip introduced the sarissa thrusting spear into the infantry’s arsenal. The sarissa was considerably longer than the standard Greek fighting spear and, if well handled, gave Macedonian infantry a distinct advantage in close combat. Philip also emphasized training and drill, thus instilling superb unit cohesion and discipline within the ranks. Philip’s reforms had an immediate effect. One year after their defeat, the Macedonians, under Philip, crushed the Illyrian army under Bardylis in a battle in which two characteristics of Macedonian warfare emerged: a vigorous cavalry attack and a punishing pursuit after the battle. The Illyrians lost 7,000 men.26
Its location and its aristocratic society contributed to the development of a mounted tradition in Macedonia. Areas of eastern Macedonia, bordering on Thrace and Chalkidike, were suitable for horse pasturing.27 An aristocratic tradition led to a concentration of wealth, which was necessary to breed, maintain, and train horses. These conditions, combined with an enemy in Thrace that was often mounted, resulted in a competent cavalry arm. Frequently changing and indifferent leadership, however, prevented the Macedonian cavalry from being exceptional, and in the same class as their southern neighbors, the Thessalians. However, this changed under the discipline and leadership of Philip II, who now applied the same strict training regime he developed for his infantry to his cavalry. Training honed the skills of the cavalry force and brought them to a level equal to the Thessalians.
Macedonian cavalry also benefited from the esteem Macedonian culture placed on the horse and horsemanship. The relationship of Philip’s son Alexander and his horse Bucephalas exemplifies the place of the horse within Macedonian culture. The prince acquired the horse at a young age, and he was his war mount through all Alexander’s most famous battles. At age 30 the horse died while on campaign in India. Alexander’s relationship with his horse, as both master and companion, and the manner in which Bucephalas is described in the ancient histories reflects the regard with which individual mounts were viewed within the Macedonian culture.28
Macedonian horse equipment had not changed significantly from what the Persians and the Assyrians had used. Cavalrymen rode bareback, with only a horse blanket, often an animal skin, between them and the horse. A leather bridle and a snaffle bit, as well as the rider’s position, controlled the horse. The Macedonians used horse armor, but in the existing evidence of Macedonian cavalry in action it is often absent. There were two primary components of Macedonian horse armor, both recommended by the Greek cavalry expert Xenophon: the peytral and the chamfron. The peytral was a metal chest protector that extended from the horse blanket forward and wrapped around the horse’s chest similar to a breast plate. The chamfron was a head covering that covered the horse’s poll and extended down the forehead to his nose. The peytral might also include a decorative crest.29
In the Greek tradition, the composite bow was not a standard part of the heavy cavalry’s equipment. Though armored, Macedonian cavalry were not as heavily armored as cavalry in southern Greece where the hoplite influence was stronger. Macedonian cavalry do not appear to have worn armored breastplates as a matter of course. Instead, a padded corselet was sometimes used. Macedonian cavalry usually wore an open face helmet of the Boeotian type, although some illustrations also indicate a Thracian type in use.30
The most important Macedonian weapon, and also the most controversial as far as the cavalry is concerned, was the sarissa. The Macedonian infantry became renowned for the exceptionally long sarissa that they employed with deadly force. This two-handed weapon was over 14 feet long and gave the infantry phalanx significant standoff distance when engaging other infantry. However, controversy remains as to whether the cavalry carried this same, unusually long weapon, or a shorter more standard cavalry lance of about 9 feet in length. Despite the controversy, the evidence indicates that whichever the cavalry carried it was longer than the combination javelin/lance of about 7 feet common among the Persian cavalry. The reason for the controversy is that the difference between a 9-foot and a 14-foot lance is significant in terms of weight and the influence the lance had in combat. It is not possible to analyze the close fighting tactics of Macedonian cavalry unless the size of the weapon is first determined. Several well-regarded experts on ancient cavalry stand on different sides of the argument. M. M. Markle, in a 1982 article titled “Macedonian Arms and Tactics under Alexander the Great,” makes the case for the longer weapon. Conversely, Robert E. Gaebel makes the argument for the shorter version of the weapon. He bases his argument on the ease of handling a shorter weapon while riding bareback and engaged in hand-to-hand combat. Gaebel maintains that the longer weapon was just too heavy to handle with one hand and that the warrior would not risk being in the midst of combat and have to drop the reins of his horse to handle a two-handed weapon.31 The more compelling argument, based on horsemanship, is for the shorter lance. A butt point on the opposite end permitted the cavalryman to rapidly change from an underhanded grip to an overhanded grip and thrust by
simply reversing the weapon. It also permitted the cavalryman to wield the weapon even if the head was broken off.
Philip inherited a cavalry force of about 600 horsemen from his brother Perdiccas. This force, in the Hippeis tradition, consisted of the loyal noble and wealthy families of Macedonia, but no matter how well trained, it was insufficient in number for the infantry–cavalry army that Philip envisioned. Philip granted land in conquered territory to entice cavalry recruits. As Philip consolidated and expanded his kingdom, more land, and consequently more horsemen, were available. Cavalry recruitment and retention was also encouraged by compensation. A Macedonian cavalryman’s pay was three times that of a Macedonian infantryman. Thessalonian cavalry, now allied to Macedonia, were paid two and a half times infantry wages. In six years, Philip expanded his cavalry force from 600 horsemen to 3,000, of which 2,000 were Macedonian natives. By the time of the battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC, the Macedonian native cavalry numbered about 3,000. Later, when Alexander prepared to invade Asia in 334 BC, the total was up to 3,300 heavy cavalry and an additional 400 light cavalry, excluding allied cavalry.32
The first obligation of these land-owning cavalrymen was service to their king. This allegiance was their livelihood. In that sense they were professional cavalrymen. As their numbers increased so did their proficiency at riding and fighting. Riding, to a large extent, is an art, and although training can impart the rudiments quickly, acquiring true proficiency requires years of experience. Philip kept his army almost continuously at war, and therefore his professional cavalry became exceptionally experienced both as individuals and as units.